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Spec i a l  f ea t u r e
Economic crisis hit Guangdong, the southern provincebordering Hong Kong and Macao, just as its growthrate was slowing after many years of acceleration.
Current economic policies seek to reverse that trend more
than to tackle the crisis.
The Pearl River Delta (PRD) in Guangdong Province pio-
neered China’s economic reforms in the 1980s and remains
a symbol of their success. The region’s exports account for
nearly 30 percent of China’s total exports.
The region owes its success in part to its proximity to Hong
Kong: drawn by the low cost of labour and the Chinese gov-
ernment’s fiscal incentives, businesses from the former
British colony moved their low-value-added, labour intensive
industries to the region, setting up tens of thousands of small
and medium enterprises (SMEs).
Thirty years later, this growth model has reached its limits:
increasing land and labour costs have reduced the region’s
competitiveness, and the delta’s energy- and resource-hungry
industries are exacerbating environmental degradation.
Aware of these limits, the provincial authorities wish to
usher the delta towards advanced and high technology activ-
ities. The authorities are taking a dual approach: moving
low-value-added units to the province’s less developed areas,
and integrating more closely with Hong Kong and Macao.
Since November 2008, however, the economic crisis has hit
Guangdong’s economic model hard, and the authorities
have had to revise their agenda. The new priority is to safe-
guard jobs and the province’s SMEs. After months of hesi-
tation, the provincial authorities made an official declaration
of support to SMEs on 1 December 2008.
Only a few months earlier, in May, they had announced the
adoption of a new policy incompatible with propping up
SMEs. The so-called “double transfer” policy had sought to
change the province’s economic development model. It was
based on the simple fact that the PRD, which accounts for
30 percent of Guangdong’s area and 50 percent of its pop-
ulation, has had extremely rapid economic growth for 30
years, while the northern, western, and eastern areas of the
province are lagging behind: according to a Guangdong
Academy of Social Sciences researcher interviewed by Cai-
jing magazine, per capita GDP in the PRD is four times
that of the province’s outlying areas. Moreover, the concen-
tration of industries in the delta has added to pressure on re-
sources and the environment: water pollution (1) and energy
bottlenecks (2) are among numerous problems.
The solution the authorities envisaged was to relocate
labour-intensive, low-value-added industries to less devel-
oped regions and to attract advanced industries and high-
value services to the delta. This policy included provisions
for labour retraining. People in less developed regions of
Guangdong were to be trained to meet the needs of newly
relocated secondary and tertiary enterprises. At the same
time, the better qualified workers from these regions were to
be encouraged to move to the PRD.
Some 50 billion yuan (5.24 billion euros) was allocated for
the 2008-2012 period for infrastructure construction in the
1. “World Bank Helps Clean up China’s Pearl River,” China.org.cn, 22 March 2007.
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less developed areas, relocation of industries, and retraining,
and 2.5 billion yuan (26 millions euros) as incentives for en-
terprises. Furthermore, the success of the industry relocation
policy was to be added to the criteria for evaluating local
cadres.
However, since the “double transfer” policy was announced
in May 2008, the PRD’s economic scenario has changed
greatly. Falling external demand, the yuan’s appreciation, ris-
ing labour costs following a new labour contract law, and the
tightening of credit have squeezed firms in the region.
According to Caijing, Guangdong’s industrial, political, and
academic circles questioned the rationale of the double
transfer policy in the prevailing economic situation: many
people felt the priority should be the survival rather than the
transfer of enterprises. This was echoed by officials in Dong-
guan, one of the PRD’s nine prefectures: while a few con-
tinued to back the province’s announced policy, most wanted
enterprises to be modernised right where they were. Many
officials also doubted the PRD’s ability to attract high tech-
nology firms, advanced industry, and high-value services, cit-
ing the region‘s lack of qualified personnel.
Central authorities were also sceptical of the double transfer
policy. On 12 November 2008, Wang Yang, who has been
provincial Communist Party secretary since December 2007
and a Politburo member since October 2007, announced
during a visit to Zhangjiang, in the west of Guangdong, that
local authorities would no longer try to prop up firms in dif-
ficulty. In fact, Wang said, “Failed enterprises belong to a
backward production method,” and “their elimination is part
of market mechanism.” Two days later, however, Premier
Wen Jiabao, while visiting Guangdong, publicly called for
strong measures to support SMEs facing difficulty. A week
later, Wang reiterated his position. (3) Finally, on 1 Decem-
ber 2008, the province announced steps to support SMEs,
mothballing the double transfer policy.
Wang has also been behind the initiative for integrating the
PRD, covering nine prefectures in Guangdong as well as
Hong Kong and Macao. (4) A little while after he took up his
party post in Guangdong, Wang launched a consultation
with several authorities and research institutes in the
province. According to Caijing, Wang twice consulted Hong
Kong chief executive Donald Tsang during the report prepa-
ration process. In March 2008, during the annual session of
the National People’s Congress, Wang hawked its conclu-
sions to different ministries. The unpublished report recom-
mended facilitating trade and investment exchanges among
Hong Kong, Macao, and the Chinese mainland through
simplification of customs and of procedures linked to the free
trade and investment accord under the CEPA (Closer Eco-
nomic Partnership Arrangement) signed in 2003 by the
mainland, Hong Kong, and Macao. 
The report included an ambitious roadmap for integrating
the three sides’ financial sectors: it envisaged the creation of
a pilot zone for financial cooperation between Hong Kong
and Shenzhen “before 2010.” This pilot was to subsequently
include Macao and eight other mainland prefectures by
2015: the financial institutions of Hong Kong, Macao, and
the PRD prefectures were to receive the same treatment in
each others’ territories, and foreign exchange control for in-
vestments was to be suspended. Finally, with a 20-year hori-
zon, the report also proposed that central authorities dele-
gate part of their legislative responsibility in order to enable
the pilot zone to acquire necessary competences for harmon-
ising the three sides’ financial sectors.
According to Caijing, the report drew the central authorities’
attention to the issue of integrating the PRD, and a series
of measures were announced for strengthening cooperation
among the delta’s three partners. Thus, an amendment to
CEPA was signed on 29 July 2008 by Hong Kong and the
mainland, granting Hong Kong firms greater access to the
mainland, especially to Guangdong, from 2009. A week
later, the governments of Guangdong, Hong Kong, and
Macao  announced the financing of a major infrastructure
project – the construction of a bridge linking Hong Kong,
Macao, and the mainland starting from 2010.
As economic conditions worsened by the end of 2008, the
government took note of the difficulties facing export SMEs
in the delta. On 18 December, it announced a plan to sup-
port the PRD’s development, underlining the importance of
cooperation among its different zones. Finally, a step to-
wards the yuan’s convertibility was taken on 24 December:
it would be used for settling commercial payments among
the Yangtze Delta, the PRD, and Hong Kong and Macao.
This measure will primarily benefit export industries in the
PRD region.
Meanwhile, academics interviewed by Caijing were not op-
timistic about prospects for the measures, saying the author-
ities are still far from adopting institutional changes needed
for ensuring the PRD’s integration.•
95N o  2 0 0 9 / 1
3. Wu Zhong, “Regions Won’t Dance to Beijing Tune,” Asia Times Online, 26 November
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While at first it seemed that China was relativelysheltered from the global financial crisis, to thepoint of being seen as a possible saviour, it rap-
idly began to show multiple signs of weakness: 20 million mi-
grant workers lost their jobs, (5) and thousands of firms closed
down. Disquiet in the country’s interior is growing. The un-
employment rate in December 2008 was 4.2 percent, the
highest in five years. Among young graduates it was 12 per-
cent. (6)
Employment for graduates is one of the more nerve-wrack-
ing issues in the crisis, and Chinese authorities have ac-
corded it priority: in June 2009, as many as 6.1  million
young graduates will enter the job market, joining one mil-
lion graduates from 2008 who are still looking for work.
China Newsweek looks at the employment problem for
young graduates, the consequences of joblessness, and the
factors behind the phenomenon, profiling a Beijing law stu-
dent, Chen Zao, and interviewing Zheng Gongcheng, an
NPC standing committee member and professor at People’s
University, who is also an expert on social issues.
The weekly does focus on the effects of the 2008 financial
crash, but only to the extent that it has exacerbated a much
older and deeper problem linked to the evolution of an un-
balanced economic model highly lacking in social protection.
How does the joblessness problem among young graduates
highlight the larger economic malaise? What are its effects
and challenges, and how is the state responding?
Chen Zao’s situation illustrates the battle upcoming gradu-
ates face in their job search. This school year is charac-
terised by an unprecedented uncertainty gripping campuses.
Unlike in previous years, by late December a majority of stu-
dents from universities in coastal cities had failed to sign a
job contract. Reduction in the numbers employed at major
firms, a freeze or suppression of posts, and the collapse of
thousands of firms in Guangdong, Fujian, and the Yangtze
Delta (7) led to a steep drop in job opportunities for young
graduates. SMEs, the main employers of young graduates in
China, (8) were hit hard by the crisis, further hurting students’
job prospects. The key sectors of finance and foreign trade
turned moribund, disappointing students who had been eye-
ing them. The phenomenon of students applying for jobs far
removed from their educational background gained promi-
nence. As a direct consequence, civil service examinations
are now attracting substantial numbers of worried students.
This is not only because the government decided to raise its
recruitment quota, but mainly because, in the context of eco-
nomic crisis, such jobs, considered less attractive and not as
well paid as the private sector, are seen as offering greater
job security, guaranteed social protection, and less harsh
competition.
These issues go beyond the frame of the current crisis; they
have more complex origins, not “foreign” this time, but inti-
mately linked to the evolution in the growth model China
adopted years ago.
In education, alongside the exponential rise in the number
of students entering university faculties, (9) the government’s
attitude swung from strong interventionism – to the extent
that it took charge of assigning graduates to different sectors
– to complete disengagement, obliging students to compete
in the open market. China Newsweek blames an ill-adapted
higher education system in which a third of the students fail
to get jobs in the sectors they trained for. According to
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5. “20 million jobless migrant workers return home,” Xinhuanet, 2 February 2009.
6. “China’s Solution for Unemployed College Grads: State Jobs in the Boonies,” Washing-
ton Post, 30 January 2009.
7. Figures from the SME office in Guangdong show that between January and September
2008, some 60,000 firms closed down.
8. China Newsweek notes that more than 50 percent of students are recruited by SMEs. 
9. The number of students has risen from 200,000 in the 1980s to 6 million in 2008 due
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Zheng Gongcheng, it is also a non-egalitarian, discrimina-
tory system in which an impressive CV and personal connec-
tions play a disproportionately large part, leading to wasted
potential.
More seriously, the difficulties facing young job-seekers are
linked to weaknesses in post-reform China’s socio-economic
system. China Newsweek notes that the number of gradu-
ates has been rising faster than the number of available jobs
suited to their qualifications. The job-creating power of eco-
nomic growth has mostly shrunk: too much industrial con-
centration; major state firms’ monopoly over key sectors, lim-
iting the expansion prospects of private enterprises while
public sector jobs have been declining; a “down market” in-
dustrial sector and difficulty creating jobs for qualified peo-
ple; a major regional imbalance in the country’s develop-
ment — all of these factors impose pressure on the job mar-
ket. Moreover, the priority given to exports has for too long
been at the expense of the internal market. To conclude, in
the 1980s a one-point rise in the GDP led to two million
jobs, as against a mere 800,000 in 2008. Added to this, the
social protection system remains incomplete and unequal,
leading to a climate of insecurity. Looking beyond the crisis,
the government ought to give priority to these weaknesses: if
not, the job difficulties facing graduates will only grow,
blocking the transformation of the students’ potential into a
real source of competitiveness.
The government announced a series of urgent short-term
measures in response to public unease over the crisis. No-
tably, it once again raised recruitment quotas in public serv-
ice and state firms. But, says China Newsweek, the quotas
have already been filled in many departments, and in state
firms weakened by the crisis, (10) the additional burden to the
salaried ranks would be difficult to bear, all of which limits
the effectiveness of such measures. Moreover, the state is en-
couraging students to perform community service in rural
and backward areas that severely lack qualified personnel. (11)
However, this is not something students like Chen Zao as-
pire to.
In the long term, Zheng says, the state ought to set right the
five major weaknesses of the system. (12) These include the
territorial balance and the need to invest in major infrastruc-
ture works to reduce geographic inequalities and to extend
employment zones. More crucially, the state needs to adopt
an adequate universal social protection system covering re-
tirement, health, unemployment, and disability. This implies
greater state engagement to avoid adding to the costs of
firms and individuals. (13) This reform is crucial not only for
increasing worker confidence through a more fair, stable,
and competitive job market, but also for boosting internal
consumption that can generate further job creation.
It would thus seem that the international financial crisis and
its immediate effects on jobs in China affords an opportunity
to take a fresh look at an economic model found wanting,
and already rocked by scandal and social unrest in recent
years. It is also an opportunity to speed up social reforms
that have been sorely held back since the launch of eco-
nomic reforms and the cracking of the “iron rice bowl.” The
issue is not merely to survive the crisis and stem social un-
rest in 2009, but above all to clean up the system and usher
in sustainable development.• 
Translated by N. Jayaram
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10. State enterprise profits fell for the first time in six years by 26 percent in 2008, accord-
ing to Li Rongrong, chairman of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration
Commission of the State Council (SASAC).
11. See also “China’s Solution for Unemployed College Grads: State Jobs in the Boonies,”
Washington Post, 30 January 2009.
12. The five major weaknesses are, according to Zheng Gongcheng, inadequate social pro-
tection; an unequal job market and one based on guanxi (connections); an economic
structure that fails to create enough jobs for qualified people; geographic imbalance in
development; and a limited vision of students’ capacity.
13. “Social” costs (health, retirement, joblessness, housing) account for 50 percent of the
average household‘s budget, according to China Newsweek.
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